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This discussion puts forward the argument that the failure to devolve specific 
evidence on which the Director of Public Prosecutions sought to detain and later 
charge Dr Mohamed Haneef represents a clear miscarriage of justice.  Fundamental 
principles of natural justice require an accused perpetrator to have available the 
evidence for which accusations of wrongdoing are based unless there exist reasons 
for the contrary.  National security was given as a reason for not disclosing the 
evidence. Matters of an evidentiary nature were not provided to the accused or the 
accused’s legal council, yet the same evidence was used in secret to obtain 
prolonged periods of detention.  Haneef’s case when viewed from a human rights 
perspective, reinforces the need for the rules of evidence to be carefully assessed on 
balance of the individual’s rights versus the perceived threat to national security. 
The arrest, detention and subsequent threatened deportation of Dr Mohamed 
Haneef represents a clear miscarriage of justice as a direct result of suppressing 
vital evidence which could not be challenged by the defence.  The issue was 
compounded by the actions of the then Federal Government and the Commissioner 
of the Australian Federal Police (“AFP”) by leaking select pieces of information to the 
public in the guise of evidence to prove Dr Haneef’s guilt. 
Courts do have legal authority to order certain information or evidence to be 
suppressed in the public interest, particularly for national security.  However, in the 
Haneef affair, it is unclear that such an order was warranted given the lack of 
evidence on which the accused was charged.  What has become clear is that the 
political motivations behind suppressing the evidence was greater than any danger 
that Dr Haneef posed for the community. 
The Haneef case raises a number of questions relating to the legitimacy of 
suppressing evidence, particularly in relation to criminal matters where the 
consequences are great.  This discussion seeks to examine the various grounds for 
suppressing evidence and in doing so, argues that suppression of evidence is an 
abrogation of the rule of law and can lead to a violation of human rights. 
The Haneef Affair – Background 
On 2 July 2007,  Dr Haneef was arrested at Brisbane Airport and detained by the 
Australian Federal Police until 14 July without charge by virtue of Part 1C of 
the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth).[1]  While in custody on 14 July, Dr Haneef was charged 
with an offence under the Criminal Code 1901 (Cth)[2] in violation of anti-terrorism 
provisions that he allegedly provided a SIM card to suspected terrorists in the United 
Kingdom.  What followed was a series of court appearances and arguments from the 
police that Dr Haneef should remain in custody while police carry out further 
investigations.[3] 
Much of the argument presented by the prosecution was argued in secret without the 
defence being allowed to be present to hear specific evidence put to the 
magistrate.[4]  The reasons for this was argued on the basis that much of the 
evidence was sensitive and disclosure could jeopardise investigations already 
underway in Australia and overseas.[5]  Despite the prosecution formally 
withdrawing the charges, Dr Haneef’s work visa was subsequently cancelled by the 
then Minister for Immigration Kevin Andrews on the basis that Dr Haneef was of bad 
character.[6]  This meant that Dr Haneef could be detained in immigration detention 
under the Migration Act 1958 (Cth).[7] 
  
The Current Law of Evidentiary Non-Disclosure 
The legal basis for the suppression of information is generally argued in the pretext 
of public policy since on the basis that it is not in the public interest to disclose all 
relevant information in court proceedings in all situations.[8]  Courts must then 
balance the public interest against the interest of the administration of justice.[9]  The 
issue for the courts is further compounded when the Crown is seeking to suppress 
evidence, the grounds for which give the appearance of being politically 
motivated[10] or over zealous paranoia.[11] 
In Sankey v Whitlam[12] it was stated by Gibbs ACJ and Stephen J that the court 
‘will not compel or permit the disclosure of information where to do so would be 
injurious to state interests’.  Damage to ‘state interests’ can be broadly taken to 
mean the detriment occurring to national security or other national interests and 
there does not appear to be a fixed description of what constitutes national 
interests.[13] 
A claim to public interest immunity is based on an argument that particular 
documents belong to a ‘class’ of documents and by virtue of their very nature should 
not be given to a party in a proceeding.[14]  Such documents include but do not 
appear to be limited to, Cabinet papers, governmental papers, minutes of 
discussions between heads of departments, Cabinet submissions and documents 
relating to high level government policy.[15]  The threat to national security can arise 
when the defence or diplomatic relations of a nation are in jeopardy by disclosing 
specific evidence.[16] 
Proponents of suppressing evidence argue that some information is so sensitive and 
important to the state that the need for non-disclosure would outweigh the 
‘administration of justice’.[17]  Usually this arises in time of war and in the case 
of Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd v Anglo-Persian Oil Co Ltd[18] the distinction was drawn 
between the nature of the information sought to be protected.  In that case it was 
held that the information must be more than merely confidential as opposed to where 
the information will be harmful to the general public interest and cause actual 
detriment to the state.[19]  Further examples show that the courts are willing to 
suppress documents that are specifically related to the production of submarines and 
other defence infrastructure since there is a specific risk to national security were 
that information fall into the hands of the enemy.[20] 
In criminal proceedings, the suppression of evidence on the basis of public interests 
is generally given to protect the identity of police informers and in Queensland, such 
prohibition is incorporated into statute.[21]  Suppression of information for criminal 
proceedings can also be permitted where the likelihood of disclosure would lead to 
failed investigations.  In the case of Attorney General (NSW) v Stuart, where police 
investigations were on foot immunity was given since the production of information 
that could have been used as evidence in a trial, would have had serious 
implications for the future direction of other related investigations.[22] 
There is little disputing that there exists sufficient precedent allowing the AFP to 
apply for a suppression order in the case of Dr Haneef on the basis of national 
security or other public interests.  However what has come to light in the collapse of 
the prosecution’s case, is that there was insufficient evidence from the beginning to 
not only substantiate a trial but also to keep Dr Haneef detained for extended 
periods.[23]  The fact that  the AFP were able to obtain a number of judicial orders 
keeping Dr Haneef in detention without disclosing evidence was in itself a 
miscarriage of justice. 
  
Miscarriage of Justice: The Right to a Fair Trial 
In the Haneef affair, an actual miscarriage of justice occurred in the prolonged 
detention of Dr Haneef resulting from the defence not being able to scrutinise 
important information used as the basis on which to detain and subsequently 
withdraw Dr Haneef’s work visa.[24]  The consequences of suppressing that 
information could have lead to a trial where the defence had to prepare submissions 
blind to much of the substance behind the allegations.  A further consequence of 
which may have lead to the incarceration or deportation of Dr Haneef.  Such a failing 
to disclose specific evidence is a clear violation of the accused person’s liberty, right 
to know the case against him, the right to a fair hearing and the presumption of 
innocence.[25] 
The suppression of evidence violates the principles of a fair trial and open justice in 
criminal trials.[26]  The issue is relevant to natural justice and procedural fairness 
which themselves are regarded as fundamental principles in the rule of law as 
recognised in modern democratic societies.[27]  A general principle of the ule of law 
doctrine operates whereby ‘all individuals and groups recognise an obligation to 
comply with law, and act accordingly’.[28]  Walker argues that a fundamental 
component in the rule of law is that any law should be based on the respect for the 
‘supreme value’ of humanity.[29]  Such respect entails that the law provide dignity 
and equality for those who come before it.[30] 
The preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) states that 
‘inherent dignity’ is the foundation of peace and justice.[31]  Article 1 of the UDHR 
states that ‘all human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights’.  Dignity is 
therefore a universally recognised right and an essential component for the well 
being of all mankind.  The meaning of ‘dignity’ can be described as a quality of state 
of being[32] in humans and is as much associated with how an individual sees 
themselves as are perceptions as to how others see one’s self.[33]   The violation of 
dignity is associated with ‘dehumanising and turning the individual into a cog in an 
impersonal social machine’.[34] 
Justice Spigelman of the New South Wales Supreme Court has written that a fair 
trial to an accused is paramount and; 
‘The right of an accused to fair and timely disclosure of the Crown case and to 
materials held by the Crown, so that all relevant evidence must either be led by the 
Crown or made available to the defence is well established.’[35] 
Maccormick argues further that legal certainty with regards to evidence is a hallmark 
trait of a fair trial.[36]   Certainty in the law is fundamental since such certainty 
provides society with specific rules and standards by which citizens’ conduct will be 




The former Attorney-General, Mr Phillip Ruddock argues that terrorism is one of the 
greatest threats society now faces.[38]  Such sentiment is the underlying philosophy 
for the previous Government’s counter-terrorism policy, subsequent 
legislation[39] and trials that have followed.   Such a philosophical reasoning has 
appeared to have permeated the courts as Gleeson CJ states in the context of 
control orders; 
‘the exercise of [such] powers, independently, impartially and judicially, especially 
when such powers affect the liberty of the individual, would ordinarily be regarded as 
a good thing, not something to be avoided.   To decide that such powers are 
exclusively within the province of the executive branch of government would be 
contrary to our legal history, and would not constitute an advance in the protection of 
human rights.’[40] 
It seems therefore, that the courts are willing to give wide interpretation to the new 
anti-terror laws and this has been shown in the case of Thomas v Mowbray where a 
control order was placed on an individual despite there being a complete lack of 
evidence for which to convict the accused in an Australian court.[41] 
However, as exposed by the Haneef affair, there is a fundamental problem in 
deviating from providing the accused with a fair trial by suppressing evidence on the 
basis of national security or other public interests.  The problem leads to a violation 
of the rule of law with the way evidence is presented in court in absence of making 
same available to the defence for scrutiny.  This problem was only exposed due to 
the high degree of media attention and as such it raises the question whether this 
type of incident is isolated only to the area of suspected terrorism or can occur in any 
criminal case.[42] 
  
Perhaps Benjamin Franklin said it best when he stated that ‘any society that would 
give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve 
[1] Peter Russo, ‘Haneef: Peter Russo’s Story’ (2008) 35(2) Brief 6. 
[2] Section 102.7(2). 
[3] Stephen Keim, ‘Whither Now?; Pondering the Haneef Case’ (2008) 
30(3) Bulletin 8, 21. 
[4] Peter Russo, ‘Haneef: Peter Russo’s Story’ (2008) 35(2) Brief 6. 
[5] Ibid, 6-7. 
[6] Stephen Keim, ‘Trials and Tribulations’ (2008) Australasian Law Management 
Journal 16, 16-17. 
[7] Section 501; Andrew Lynch, ‘Achieving Security, Respecting Rights and 
Maintaining the Rule of Law’ in Andrew Lynch, Edwina Macdonald & George 
Williams (eds) Law and Liberty In the War on Terror (2007) 222, 226. 
[8] J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (7th ed, 2004) 868. 
[9] Suzanne McNicol & Debra Mortimer Evidence (3rd ed, 2005) 73; see 
also, Australian National Airlines Commission v Commonwealth (1995) 132 CLR 
582. 
[10] Waleed Aly, ‘Axioms of Aggression: Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Productivity 
in Australia’ (2008) 33 Alternative Law Journal 20, 24. 
[11] Joanne Knight ‘Exorcising Terrorism’ (2008) 3 Dissent 38, 39. 
[12] (1978) 142 CLR 1, 38. 
[13] J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (7th ed, 2004) 874. 
[14] Suzanne McNicol & Debra Mortimer Evidence (3rd ed, 2005) 73. 
[15] Ibid. 
[16] J D Heydon, Cross on Evidence (7th ed, 2004) 874-5. 
[17] Ibid, 875. 
[18] [1916] 1 KB 822. 
[19] Ibid. 
[20] Duncan v Cammell, Laird & Co Ltd [1942] AC 624. 
[21] Evidence Act 1977 (Qld) ss21A-21K. 
[22] (1994) 34 NSWLR 667. 
[23] Joanne Knight ‘Exorcising Terrorism’ (2008) 3 Dissent 38, 39. 
[24] Dr Haneef was detained for 12 days before a bail application was successfully 
lodged.  The AFP tried unsuccessfully to keep Dr Haneef detained while they 
gathered sufficient evidence for which to proceed to trial. 
[25] Andrew Lynch, ‘Achieving Security, Respecting Rights and Maintaining the Rule 
of Law’ in Andrew Lynch, Edwina Macdonald & George Williams (eds) Law and 
Liberty In the War on Terror (2007) 222, 231. 
[26] Nicholas Niarchos ‘Terrorism Laws and the Abrogation of the Rule of Law in 
Australia’ (2008) 84 Precedent 10, 13. 
[27] Geoffrey De Q Walker, The Rule of Law (1988) 1-7. 
[28] Ibid. 
[29] Ibid, 6. 
[30] Ibid. 
[31] Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York, 10 December, 1948, 
Preamble. 
[32] Merriam Webster Online Dictionary < http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/dignity> at 26 May, 2008. 
[33] Johnathan Mann, ‘Dignity and Health: The UDHR’s Revolutionary First Article’ 
(1998) 3(2) Health and Human Rights 31, 31-34. 
[34] David Lindsay, ‘An Exploration of the Conceptual Basis of Privacy and the 
Implications for the Future of Australian Privacy Law’ (2005) 
4 Melbourne University Law Review 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/journals/MULR/2005/4.html?query=human%20dignity#fn142> at 29 
May, 2008; For a general discussion of dignity and morals see, generally Max 
Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (1947). 
[35] Hon JJ Spigelman AC, ‘The Truth Can Cost Too Much: The Principle of a Fair 
Trial’ (2004) 78 Australian Law Journal 29, 37. 
[36] Neil Mccormick, ‘Rhetoric and the Rule of Law’ in David Dyzenhaus 
(ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (1999) 163. 
[37] Neil Mccormick, ‘Rhetoric and the Rule of Law’ in David Dyzenhaus 
(ed), Recrafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order (1999) 165. 
[38] Philip Ruddock, ‘Law As A Preventative Weapon Against Terrorism’ in in 
Andrew Lynch, Edwina Macdonald and George Williams (eds) , Law and 
Liberty (2007) 3. 
[39] See, Anti-Terrorism Act (No 2) 2005 (Cth). 
[40] Philip Ruddock, ‘Law As A Preventative Weapon Against Terrorism’ in in 
Andrew Lynch, Edwina Macdonald and George Williams (eds) , Law and 
Liberty (2007) 3. 
[41] (2007) 81 Australian Law Journal Review 1414. 
[42] Stephen Keim, ‘Whither Now?; Pondering the Haneef Case’ (2008) 
30(3) Bulletin 8, 21. 
 
